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This paper provides an applied general equilibrium analysis of several alternative taxation 
regimes applying to superannuation. It is motivated by the decision, announced by the 
Australian Government in its 2006 Budget, to exempt from tax all superannuation benefits 
received by recipients over 60 years of age. The analysis focuses on the implications of this 
and other superannuation tax regimes for intergenerational equity, national living standards, 
labour supply, saving and social welfare. The method of analysis is simulation of an open 
economy overlapping generations CGE model, calibrated to Australia.  
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1  Introduction 
Superannuation tax structures can be broadly described in terms of the treatment during three 
separate stages. These concern the contributions to a superannuation fund from pre-tax 
income, the earnings obtained by the fund and the income withdrawn from the fund after 
retirement. The letters T and E are used respectively in turn to indicate whether the 
component is taxed or is exempt, so that, for example, a system is described as being of the 
TTT variety if tax is imposed in all three stages. 
The aim in this paper is to examine, using an overlapping generations general 
equilibrium model, unanticipated shifts from a TTT structure to other tax systems: TTE, ETT 
and EET. The latter is the common model in OECD countries and Horne (2002) pointed out 
that Australia was the only OECD country to adopt the TTT system. In the analysis presented 
here, it is assumed that any change to superannuation taxation must be budget neutral, 
implying either increases in other taxation or cuts in government spending.  
This paper is motivated by the changes to the taxation of superannuation announced in 
the 2006 Australian Government Budget. One important change was the decision to exempt 
from tax all superannuation benefits, whether taken in the form of a lump sum or annuity, for 
all people over 60 years of age and to apply from 1 July 2007. This was unanticipated and 
therefore has the potential to significantly affect saving plans, especially for middle-aged 
workers, with resulting implications for intergenerational equity. There are also several 
potential general equilibrium effects. Changes in tax rates can affect the relative price of 
leisure and present consumption relative to future consumption, thereby affecting labour 
supply and saving.  
The budgetary implications for the government may be non-trivial given population 
ageing because the government has cut off a revenue stream that would otherwise have grown 
with the increasing proportion of households who are self-funded retirees. This is likely to be 
a bigger issue if superannuation contribution rates increase in response to the new tax 
incentives.
1 The government’s budget constraint implies that other taxes must ultimately rise, 
                                                 
 
 
1 Davidson and Guest (2006) calculated the potential fiscal costs of the tax exemption of superannuation benefits 
in the future given alternative assumptions about increasing contribution rates. The fiscal costs of the 
superannuation changes, while small at current contribution rates, could escalate substantially for modest   3
or spending must fall, in response to superannuation tax concessions. These adjustments cause 
offsetting effects on labour supply, saving and equity.  
It can be shown that under certain assumptions the various tax regimes are equivalent 
in the sense that a shift from a TTT to a TTE regime would have no effect on lifetime 
superannuation balances and therefore no behavioural effects for optimising agents. See the 
Appendix and, for a continuous time exposition, Kingston and Piggott (1993). However a 
critical assumption underlying this equivalence is neutrality with respect to superannuation 
revenue (in present value terms) which is unlikely to apply and could not be assumed by 
households to apply. This, and the fact that tax policy changes are almost always 
unanticipated by households, means that such changes have the potential to affect saving 
plans with resulting implications for intergenerational equity, macroeconomic variables and 
economic welfare. The initial effects are likely to be stronger than the long run effects 
because the unanticipated nature of the policy causes relatively large adjustments immediately 
following the shock as middle aged households, in particular, adjust their behaviour over a 
short time frame.  
The simulations ignore the many complexities of the regulations governing the 
taxation of superannuation which take into account a range of circumstances of taxpayers. 
Rather, the simulation model is based on the behaviour of a single representative household of 
each generation. This means that it cannot reveal effects on within-generation income 
inequality which could be substantial given the variation of superannuation balances of 
individuals within generations.
2  
Although the model determines the optimal labour-leisure choice of workers it does 
not consider the portfolio allocation problem in terms of the decision about the proportion of 
financial wealth to allocate between superannuation and other financial assets.
3 Instead of 
endogenising the choice of portfolio mix the model assumes, in line with the Australian 
mandatory system, an exogenous and constant rate of superannuation contributions is initially 
                                                                                                                                                          
 
 
increases in contribution rates. Their calculations were not based on optimising decisions and therefore did not 
attempt to model any general equilibrium effects, such as labour supply and saving responses, nor was there any 
consideration of intergenerational equity and social welfare. 
2 Atkinson, Creedy and Knox (1996) considered within-generation inequality in their analysis of alternative 
retirement income strategies using the LITES microsimulation model. But their model did not allow a general 
equilibrium analysis or an analysis of inequality between generations. 
3 The latter is analysed in a life-cycle model with endogenous leisure by, for example, Bodie, Merton and 
Samuelson (1992).   4
assumed in the base case. Later, simulations are reported for increasing contribution rates 
over time. The retirement age is also exogenous. However, households optimally vary their 
labour force participation rates over their lifetime, given initial rates according to data.
4  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the simulation model; Section 3 
describes the data and parameter values; Section 4 discusses the results and Section 5 
concludes.  
 
2  The model 
The simulation model is an open economy, overlapping generations model with four sectors: 
firms, households, government and an overseas sector. 
2.1   Firms 
A representative firm produces output of a single good according to a Cobb-Douglas 
production function. Output, Y, in period j is given by  
  ( )
1
jj j YKA L
α α −
=  (1) 
where A is an exogenous technology parameter
5,  Kj is the capital stock in year j, and Lj is 








=∑ where Li,j is the labour of generation i working in year j. 
The optimal capital stock, Kj, is determined by the first-order condition that the net 
marginal product of capital (net of depreciation, δ) is equal to the cost of capital, r, which is 
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4 See Kulish, Smith and Kent (2006) for a model of optimal retirement in response to population ageing in the 
Australian context. Their aim is to consider the effects of changes fertility and longevity on the retirement age 
rather than to consider policy shocks as here. 
5The technology parameter is constant, implying zero technical progress. The reason, as also given in Kulish et 
al. (2006), is that the leisure to consumption ratio would eventually decline to zero with continual productivity-
induced rises in real wages. See Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) for a further discussion. It would be possible to 
specify a non-standard utility function that could deal with this problem in the presence of technical progress, but 
this is not pursued here.   5
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Investment, Ij, is given by: 
  ( ) 1 1 jj j IKK δ − = −−  (3) 
The price, wL,j, of labour is equal to the marginal product of labour:  
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 (4) 
and it is a weighted average of the wages of all workers of age i in year j, wL,i,j, which is 
achieved by calibration (see the section below on data and parameters).  
2.2  Households 
Firms produce a single good and households consume that good and leisure. A period of time 
is five years duration and a new generation of households is born each period.
6 Each 
household consists of one person who dies at age 90, implying that there are  18 h =  
overlapping generations of households alive at any time. The households supply labour for the 
11 n =  periods between the age of 15 and 70. Households pay tax on income from both 
capital and labour (discussed below). Future values of the demographic variables and the 
parameters are known with certainty, except for the policy shock which comes as a surprise at 
which time households must adjust their plans accordingly. 
Households derive utility from consuming private goods, C, public goods, CG (the 
price of which is normalised to one), and leisure, S. Following the approach in Foertsch 
(2004),  CG is exogenous and separable from both private consumption and leisure in 
generating utility. Therefore CG does not affect the household’s choice of private consumption 
or leisure. It is therefore ignored in the derivation of the household’s optimisation problem. 
The assumption of separability between public and private consumption is a common 
assumption as noted in Foertsch (2004) because of lack of evidence about the substitutability 
between private and government consumption. The total resources available to the household 
from which to provide work effort are normalised to 1; see the discussion of work intensity 
below. These resources are time and a notional stock of ‘effort’. 
The composite index of consumption and leisure for a household of age i is: 
                                                 
 
 
6 The use of five-year periods was chosen for computational convenience.    6
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The preference for consumption relative to leisure, captured by the parameter µi, is 
assumed to vary over the lifecycle. It is assumed to rise up to middle age and then fall. This 
pattern is designed to reflect the observed life cycle pattern of consumption which tends to 
track the well-known observed hump-shaped pattern of income to some degree, rising during 
the household’s working life and falling after retirement.  Hence µi follows an inverted U-
shape, given by the quadratic: 
 
2
12 3 i ii µ ξξ ξ =+ −  (6) 
where ξ1, ξ2, and ξ3 are parameters determined by calibration. 
Each one-person household of age i in year j earns a wage, wi,j. This is less than the 
wage of each worker, wL,i,j in order to reflect a labour force participation rate of less than 1.
7 
Hence  ,, , , , / ij L ij ij ij ww L N = . Superannuation is deducted from earnings at an exogenous and 
constant rate of x per cent, with the remainder of earnings subject to income tax at the rate, tj. 
The tax rates ts,j, ty,j and tb,j are the tax rates on, respectively, superannuation contributions, 
income on fund assets, rjBi,j, and end benefits, Bn,j, in period j. 
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where  θ  is the pure time preference rate. The price of private consumption goods is 
normalised to 1 in each period, and the ‘price of leisure’ at age i in period j is denoted  , ij p . 
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The left hand side represents the present value of expenditure (on private consumption 
goods and leisure) and the right hand side is the present value of lifetime income. The latter is 
defined to include transfer payments, fi,j, received by households aged i in year j and an 
                                                 
 
 
7 This is because the representative individuals must be workers, rather than non-participants.    7
inheritance, Q, which is assumed to be received when the household is aged  66 0 h−= ;
8 For 
simplicity, total transfer payments paid by the government in a given year are allocated 
evenly across all households alive in that year, rather than being allocated to certain 
generations. Hence total transfers in year j are  , j ji j f Nf = . The tax rate, tj,, is the tax rate in 
year j applying to income from both labour and financial assets other than superannuation. 
In writing the lifetime budget constraint in the above form, it is possible to show that 
the effective price of leisure in each period can be expressed as  ,, , ij ij ij p Ew =  where Ei,j is 
given by:
9 
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where  11 n =  is the number of periods of superannuation contributions, ty is the tax rate on 
superannuation fund earnings, tc is the tax rate on superannuation contributions which are not 
otherwise subject to income tax, tb is the tax rate on superannuation benefits, φ is the 
proportion of benefits which is tax-free, and x is the mandatory superannuation contribution 
rate equal to the proportion of gross earnings contributed to the superannuation fund. 
The structure of Ei,j reflects the nature of the tax regime applying to superannuation. 
For example, if there were no superannuation contributions, then  ( ) , 1 ij j Et = − and the relative 
price of leisure, pi,j, is the familiar expression for the net wage,  ( ) , 1 ij j wt − , that applies in 
standard single-period models of the work/leisure choice with an income tax.  
It is instructive to consider the implications for Ei,j under alternative tax regimes. 
Under a TTE regime, for which  0 b t = : 
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If, in addition,  yc ttt == , Ei,j again reduces to the simple form  ( ) , 1 ij j Et = − .
 
Under an ETT regime, for which  0 c t = : 
                                                 
 
 
8 Households leave a bequest equal to 10 per cent of their total lifetime pre-tax income. The bequest is received 
by the generation 30 years younger, which is a simplification for the purpose of generating lifetime budgets 
because the demographic data used for the simulations reflects the actual patterns of age-specific fertility. 
9 For details of the derivation of this term in a three-period framework, see Creedy and Guest (2007).    8
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 (11) 
and again if  yb ttt == , Ei,j reduces to  ( ) , 1 ij j Et = − . Finally, if in the TTT regime all tax rates 
on superannuation are the same and equal to t then it can be seen that: 
  ( )( ) , 11 ij j j Et x t =− −  (12)
 
in which case superannuation taxation reduces the relative price of leisure in the standard 
model by a factor xtj, reflecting the size of the contribution, x, and the tax on superannuation 
at all stages, tj. 
The household’s superannuation fund balance at age i in period j is 
  ( ) ( ) ()
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 (13) 
which assumes that workers retire at age  41 4 h− = , at which time superannuation is 
withdrawn and absorbed into other financial assets.
10 The balance of other financial assets at 
age i in year j is given by: 
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Given the (intertemporally) additive nature of the household’s lifetime utility function, 
the optimisation problem can be solved in two stages. First, the profile of the consumption 
index, M, over the life cycle must be determined.  
The household’s intertemporal problem is solved by maximising the utility function in 
(7) subject to the budget constraint (8). It can be shown that the first-order condition for this 
problem yields the following Euler equation for the evolution of the consumption index over 
the life cycle: 
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10 This is a simplification. The alternative would be to allow funds to be retained in superannuation accounts 
during retirement and thereby attract the concessional tax rate, ty. This is not modelled here because it would 
require a determination of the division of financial assets between superannuation and other assets in each period 
during retirement.    9
where  , ij P is defined as the price of the consumption index,  , ij M .  
Given the value of  , ij M , it is then possible to solve for the terms  , ij C  and  , ij S . The 
solution to the household’s optimisation problem yields the following relation between 

















Define total expenditure in each age as  ,, , , ij ij ij ij Z Cp S = + . Rearranging this and 
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Using the definition of  , ij P as the price of the consumption index, we can write 
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The solution to the optimisation problem can be obtained numerically as follows. 
Specify a trial value of  , ij M  for i=1, then solve forward for  , ij M  for  1,..., ih =  according to 
the Euler equation (15). For  1,..., ih =  calculate  , ij C  and  , ij S  according to (20) and (21). Then 
calculate  ,, F hj B ; if it does not equal the target bequest, then adjust  , ij M for  1 i =  and repeat the 
algorithm iteratively until the target bequest is met within a degree of tolerance. 
The labour supply of households aged i in year j,  , ij L , is given by  ,, , ij ij ij Le L =  where 
, ij L is the exogenously given size of the labour force of age i in year j and ei,j is work intensity 
defined as  ,, 1/ ij ij eS = . The notion of work intensity here follows that in Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1995, p.322) where no distinction is drawn between an increase in  , ij e that reflects a 
rise in effort from one that reflects a rise in hours worked. Both amount to an increase in 
labour supply. The present model implies, for example, that a 1 per cent increase in demand   10
for leisure gives rise to a 1 per cent decline in labour supply in terms of either effort or hours 
worked. The total resources available to the household from which to provide work effort are 
therefore normalised to ,, 1 ij ij eS = .  
The labour market is assumed to clear in each period. Competitive firms demand 
labour up to the point where the marginal product of labour is equal to the real wage, 
according to (4). Labour supply depends on the real wage via the demand for leisure of each 
household. The real wage adjusts instantaneously to equate labour demand to labour supply. 
Firms then adjust their demand for capital in response to the level of employment in order to 
maintain the desired capital-labour ratio, which is determined by (2). 
2.3  Government  
Government spending is denoted, G, and, other than transfer payments, is assumed for 
simplicity to be government consumption spending. Hence: 
  , jG j j GC f = +  (22) 
An assumption maintained throughout the simulations is that the government runs 
balanced budgets every period, so that: 
  jj GT =  (23) 
where Tj denotes total tax revenue, given by 
  ,,, jW jK jS j TT T T =++  (24) 
and where TW is tax levied on wage income, TK is tax levied on income from financial assets 
other than superannuation, TS is tax levied on superannuation at rates tc, ty and tb as defined 
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Substituting (25) into (24), then into the balanced budget condition (23), gives an 



















However, this expression is actually highly nonlinear in  j t  because several terms on the right 
hand side are functions of this and other tax rates. Hence the budget constraint must be solved   11
numerically, which is achieved through the iterative procedure of solving the life-cycle plans 
of households, as follows. Households are assumed to have perfect foresight and therefore 
know the future values of all variables that affect their plans, one of which is the tax rate, tj. 
Their plans are solved iteratively starting with a trial vector of values of all future variables; 
each new plan uses the updated vector until the values stabilise. 
The balanced budget condition implies that a reduction in taxation on superannuation 
must be budget neutral and therefore must be accompanied by either raising the tax rate 
applying to non-superannuation income, or reducing government spending. In the simulations 
it is assumed that the adjustment falls on government spending in the form of transfer 
payments, fj.
11 Therefore f,j is reduced to match any reduction in superannuation revenue. This 
implies a reduction in the household budget which therefore affects consumption of goods 
and leisure. 
Finally, the standard national accounting identity gives the evolution of foreign 
liabilities: 
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2.4  Value Judgements 
An evaluation of the path of aggregate consumption over time requires the use of a social 
welfare function, which makes value judgements about consumption in the future relative to 
present consumption explicit. Here it is assumed that an independent judge evaluates only the 
consumption that occurs in the present and the future. This implies that there is no regard for 
past consumption even by generations still alive, on the grounds that past consumption cannot 
be influenced by current and future policy. 
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11 This is done for expediency. The alternative – adjusting the tax rates applying to non-superannuation income – 








=∑ is the aggregate value of the consumption index of all households alive in 
period j;  1 j =  in 2005; H is an arbitrarily long time in the future. The parameter  s θ  is the 
pure rate of time preference of the judge and   s β  reflects the constant relative aversion to 
variability of the judge: it is the (absolute value of the) elasticity of marginal valuation. The 
form of the social welfare function also assumes that the judge takes the view that the 
appropriate unit of analysis is the individual, so that values are weighted by  j N  in each 
period.  
3  Empirical Application 
The aim of this section is to compare the various tax regimes for superannuation – TTT, TTE, 
ETT and EET - in terms of their implications for intergenerational equity, national living 
standards, labour supply, national saving and social welfare.  
3.1  Data and Parameters 
In the TTT case, the three superannuation tax rates are set equal to 15 per cent. An exemption 
of income from any of the three taxes implies setting the relevant tax rate equal to zero from 
2005 onwards.  
Government spending as a share of GDP is set equal to 0.3 for the period up to 2002 
after which it increases according to the increase in age-related spending of the Australian 
Government in Productivity Commission (2005). The categories of age-related government 
consumption spending are given in Productivity Commission (2005) and consist of health, 
aged care, carers and education; and the categories of fj are age and service pensions, family 
tax benefits, disability support benefit, unemployment allowances and parenting payments. 
Age-related spending of the Australian Government is projected to increase by 5.7 per cent 
between 2004 and 2045 according to the Productivity Commission (2005).  
The calibration is such that the size of superannuation tax revenue as a proportion of 
GDP in 2005 is equal to that reported by the Institute of Actuaries of Australia (IAA) (2006). 
The IAA calculates the following superannuation tax revenues as percentages of GDP for 
2004: contributions tax of 0.5 per cent, income tax on fund income of 0.2 per cent, and 
benefits tax of 0.05 per cent.  For the contributions tax, the value of x is set at that giving the 
total of 0.5 per cent of GDP in 2005. This figure turns out to be 5 per cent which is less than 
the 9 per cent compulsory contribution rate currently applying in Australia. This is at least   13
partly because the 5 per cent is assumed to apply to all labour income in the economy whereas 
in reality some self-employed and casual workers would not contribute to superannuation at 9 
per cent (although some workers would contribute more than 9 per cent). The IAA points out 
that a small proportion of superannuation benefits attract the benefits tax, due to the tax-free 
proportion, and there are ways in which the tax can be avoided. A value of the tax-free 
proportion, φ, equal to 0.8 generates the IAA figure of 0.05 per cent of GDP for the benefits 
tax. The interest rate on superannuation fund income is assumed to be equal to the constant 
interest rate, r, which applies to all forms of saving and borrowing. This generates tax revenue 
from super fund income equal to 0.12 per cent of GDP which is less than the IAA figure of 
0.2 per cent but close enough to avoid the complication of setting a return on super fund 
income higher than r.   
It is also necessary to allow for the likely growing popularity of superannuation as a 
saving vehicle. In Australia superannuation assets have been projected to more than double 
between 2005 and 2020 (IFSA, 2007), compared with an increase in GDP in the order of 60 
per cent (at 3 per cent compound growth). Hence superannuation assets to GDP could nearly 
double over this period. There are several reasons for this growth. The Investment and 
Financial Services Association (IFSA) (2007) reports a study suggesting that 23 per cent of 
this growth can be attributed to the changes introduced in the 2006 Australian Government 
Budget. Other factors include: the cumulative effect of the 9 per cent compulsory contribution 
rate that has applied since July 2002; the growing awareness of the benefits of superannuation 
and its increasing flexibility; and an older workforce implying a higher average propensity for 
superannuation saving across the workforce.  
Hence, an alternative set of simulations allow x to increase gradually over time from 
its base case rate of 5 per cent, increasing by 1 per cent every 5 year period after 2005 
implying that, by 2050, 14 per cent of labour income is being contributed to superannuation. 
This is plausible given the growth in popularity of superannuation which will be accentuated 
in Australia by the incentives introduced in the 2006 Budget. However, this does not apply to 
the base case simulations, for which x is fixed at 5 per cent. 
The demographic data consist of actual historical population levels, and projected 
future population levels, for each age group. These data are given in the following Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Catalogues: historic population, Catalogue 320109.1; projected 
population, Catalogue 3222.0; labour force participation rates by age, Catalogue 6291.0; and 
wage rates by age, Catalogue 6310.0. The data source for government expenditure is 
Productivity Commission (2005) as described above.    14
The wage of each worker by age in year j, wL,i,j, is calibrated such that the weighted 
average of wL,i,j over all workers of age i in year j is equal to the price of labour, wL,,j ; that is: 
  ,, , , Li j i j L j j
i
wL w L = ∑  (29) 
This is achieved by first normalising exogenous data on wages by age,  ,,   Li j w , such 
that ,,  1 Li j
i














  ,, ,, Li j Li j j ww γ =  (31) 
Table 1 presents other parameter values. The interest rate of 4 per cent is a typical 
value of the world interest rate used in CGE simulations: the assumption is that Australia is a 
small open economy. Households’ rate of time preference, θ, is the rate that would, if both the 
tax rate and the parameter µi were constant, ensure that a household’s consumption grows at 
the long run rate of growth of output, g,  implying  rg θ β = − .  
 
Table 1 Base Case Parameters and Initial Values 
Parameter 
Interest rate, r 0.04 
Rate of time preference of households,  θ  0.028 











Depreciation, δ  0.05 








Initial tax rate on all income, t 0.3 
Foreign liabilities to GDP ratio, D/Y, in 2003  0.6 
Elasticity of marginal valuation, β   2.0 
Elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure, ψ  0.8 
Bequest as a proportion of household’s lifetime income  0.1 
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The capital elasticity of output is calibrated such that the initial capital to output ratio 
is equal to 3.0, the approximate actual value for Australia in 2002. The initial tax to GDP ratio 
is set equal to 0.3 the actual value for Australia in 2002. The ratio of foreign liabilities to 
GDP, D/Y, in 2005 is calibrated so that it equals 0.6 (which is approximately the actual value) 
by finding the ratio of D/Y in 1920 that gives  /0 . 6 DY =  in 2005, where 1920 is the year in 
which household aged 85 in 2005 was born. The values of the elasticities, β and ψ , are set 
equal to common values used in related studies in the literature, see for example Foertsch 
(2004).  
A sensitivity analysis with respect to these parameter values indicated that the effects 
of the superannuation tax concessions were robust with respect to a reasonable range of 
values for each parameter. In all of the sensitivity simulations conducted, the effect of the tax 
concession on any endogenous variable in any given period was within 15 percent of the 
effect under the base case parameter value. For example, if the effect of a tax concession were 
to boost lifetime consumption for a particular generation by 0.5 percent, then no variation in a 
single parameter produced an effect outside plus or minus 15 per cent of 0.5 per cent, which is 
a range of 0.42 to 0.58 percent.  
There is no assumption that the economy is in a steady state prior to the tax smoothing 
policy shock, nor that the economy converges to a steady state. Nevertheless, the overlapping 
generations feature of the model generates fairly well-behaved state variables. In particular, 
debt and the capital stock do not take extreme values at any point in the optimal path. 
4  Simulation Results  
4.1  Consumption 
Consider first the effect of alternative tax regimes on lifetime consumption of successive 
generations. Unless otherwise stated, ‘consumption’ refers to the value of the consumption 
index, M.
12 The effect of a change in tax regime on lifetime consumption depends on its effect 
on lifetime income, as reflected in the budget constraint, (8). The elimination of a 
superannuation tax implies an increase in the after-tax wage or relative price of leisure, pi,j . 
                                                 
 
 
12 An alternative would have been to consider the effects on goods consumption, C, only, thereby ignoring 
leisure. Inspection of the simulation results showed the effects on goods consumption, C, were not qualitatively 
different to the effects on the consumption index, M.    16
This is offset by a decrease in transfer payments, fi,j, according to the assumption that the 
government balances its budget in each period by offsetting any change in superannuation 
revenue by a dollar for dollar change in transfer payments. However, the offset is not exact 
for several reasons. The main reason is that the tax change is unanticipated, the effect of 
which is discussed further below; and there are other minor factors at work meaning that even 
if the tax change were entirely anticipated there would still be small net effects on lifetime 
income which would differ among generations.
13  
Figure 1 plots the difference between lifetime consumption under three alternative tax 
regimes: TTE, ETT and EET, compared with the base case: TTT.  
 













Exempting benefits in the TTE system boosts the after-tax superannuation balances of 
older generations more than it does for younger generations because older generations have 
larger balances at the time the exemption is introduced and hence receive a relatively large 
windfall, yet they have not had to pay for the cost of this windfall through lower transfer 
payments during their lives. However, younger generations however pay for the tax 
                                                 
 
 
13 In any given year the budgetary cost of the tax exemption, which is met by a reduction in transfer payments, is 
spread evenly across all households, whereas the boost in after-tax income accrues more to households at a 
higher income stage of their lifecycle. Also, the cost in lost transfer payments relative to the gain in after-tax 















exemption enjoyed by older generations before they in turn receive the tax exemption. Hence 
the net lifetime gain to older generations is greater than for younger generations. This is 
reflected in the declining size of the bars in Figure 1 for the TTE case.  
Exempting super contributions (ETT) generates the opposite pattern on lifetime 
consumption of successive generations. It boosts the after-tax superannuation balances of 
younger generations more than that of older generations for the simple reason that younger 
generations have more years from which to benefit from higher after tax contributions than 
older generations. Hence, Figure 1 displays a rise in the size of the bars for successive 
generations from the 1950 generation to generations born recently. For subsequent 
generations the ETT series follows a slight cyclical pattern. This can be explained by the 
cyclical pattern of the support ratio.
14  
The EET case turns out to be little different from the ETT case in its effect on lifetime 
consumption (see Figure 1) and other variables of interest. This implies that exempting from 
tax superannuation fund income as well as contributions makes little difference. This can be 
verified by differentiating (9) with respect to each of the tax rates which shows that the impact 
of ty is smaller than for the other tax rates. For this reason we do not report results for the EET 
case beyond the result given in Figure 1. 
Figure 2 shows the effect of the ETT and TTE regimes on average consumption per 
capita, or living standards, in each period from 2005 to 2050. In the initial few periods from 
2005 the impact on living standards is greater in the TTE case than the ETT case. This is 
because of the large adjustment of older generations as described above. However, over time 
this relationship is reversed - the ETT effect becomes greater. In the long term the effect of 
removing the benefits tax is relatively small because the tax free threshold on benefits implies 
that only 20 per cent of benefits are subject to tax, whereas 100 per cent of contributions are 
subject to tax. The absolute size of the effect on consumption per capita declines from 1.4 to 
0.2 per cent in the TTE case and from 0.8 to 0.4 per cent in the ETT case. 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
14 The support ratio at a given time determines the superannuation contributions for all workers alive at that time. 
Hence when the support ratio is falling, the size of super contributions is falling and the benefit of a tax 
exemption on contributions is therefore smaller. This explains the relatively smaller gain for generations born 
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4.2  Labour Supply  
The effect on labour supply depends on the difference between the income effect and the 
substitution effect. More precisely, the labour supply effect is measured by the elasticity of 
demand for leisure with respect to the tax rate which equals the difference between the 
elasticity of future full income with respect to the tax rate and the elasticity of the price of 
leisure with respect to the tax rate (see Creedy and Guest, 2007). 
In the TTE case, the elasticity of future full income is relatively large for older 
generations because the reduction in benefits tax applies to all of their past accrued benefits, 
and is therefore a relatively large proportion of their remaining lifetime full income compared 
with the case for younger generations. Hence the income effect for older generations is 
relatively strong and outweighs the substitution effect resulting in a larger decline in labour 
supply for older households. See Figure 3. A way of interpreting this is that older households 
have, in hindsight, overworked during their lives in aiming for their target bequest. They 
immediately adjust by buying more leisure and hence reducing their labour supply. As the 
effect on the labour supply of older generations falls, the aggregate effect on labour supply 
diminishes over time, as shown in Figure 3.  
 
 


























4.3  National Savings 
The effects on national savings are reported because the desire to boost savings is a motive 
not just for superannuation reform in Australia but more generally for pension reform in 
OECD countries. The aim is to shift the funding of retirement incomes from the public to the 
private sector. This requires an increase in private saving so that the present generation of 
workers can fund the retirement incomes of two generations of workers – themselves and the 
current generation of retirees who still rely heavily on the public pension. However, the effect 
on private saving would be diminished to the extent that workers shift savings from other 
saving vehicles to superannuation. It has been estimated with respect to Australia for example 
that compulsory allocations of saving into superannuation results in up to a 50 per cent 
leakage from other saving vehicles (Freebairn, 1998). The question of interest here is whether 
such a leakage occurs in response to tax concessions on superannuation. 
The assumptions of the model call for a qualified response to this question. For 
instance the portfolio allocation problem is ignored – the superannuation contribution rate is 
exogenous and constant. Households’ bequests are also fixed as a proportion of lifetime 
income. Furthermore, the government’s budget is balanced by reducing transfer payments 
dollar for dollar with any tax concession on superannuation. Given these assumptions and 













which calls for a substitution of consumption for leisure thereby reducing saving. This can be 
seen from (21) after substituting Ei,j into pi,j and Pi,j . The income effect is close to zero 
because every dollar of superannuation tax concession is offset by a dollar reduction in 
transfer payments in terms of the effect on the government’s budget. This is reflected in the 
lifetime budget constraint, (8), by an increase in pi,j offset by a decrease in fi,j. The net 
outcome of a neutral income effect and a negative substitution effect on saving is a lower 
saving rate. This is illustrated in Figure 4.  
 













Under all tax regimes the saving rate falls over time as the standard consequence of 
population ageing in models such as this – the reason being that the proportion of households 
at the high income, high saving age declines. The tax concessions do not alter this effect 
qualitatively, but they reduce saving in all periods - in the ETT case by a constant 0.4 per cent 
in all years, and in the TTE case by 0.8 per cent initially and falling to 0.4 per cent by 2050. 
4.4  Social Welfare 
The measure of social welfare, V, is cardinal and therefore the effect on V can be calculated 
directly. The effect could in principle be sensitive to the choice of parameters βs and θs. 
Hence we report results for various combinations of values of these parameters. Except in the 
extreme case where βs, the effects on V are within 5 percent of the base case values. 
The results are given in Table 2. Under the base case parameter values:βs=2 and θs=3 
per cent, the effect of the TTE, ETT and EET regimes compared with the TTT regime is to   21
increase social welfare by 0.38, 0.42 and 0.46 percent, respectively. The ranking by size of the 
effects is consistent with the results discussed above. One source of the welfare gain is the 
reduction in the distortionary effects of taxation since the elimination of a tax which distorts 
the price of leisure (pi,j) is funded by a reduction transfer payments (fi,j) which are in lump-
sum form and therefore non-distortionary.  
 










0.0 2.0  0.33  0.41  0.45 
2.8 2.0  0.38  0.42  0.46 
8.0 2.0  0.43  0.44  0.47 
4.0 0.2  0.31  0.34  0.37 
4.0 1.0  0.00  0.00  0.00 
4.0  10.0 3.34 3.76 4.09 
 
The welfare effect is also a result of the social evaluation of the intertemporal 
consumption effect of the change in taxation, which depends on the form and parameters of 
the social welfare function. In particular, consumption gains near to the present are “worth” 
more than the same gains further in the future. This explains why the elimination of the 
benefits tax (TTE) yields a large welfare gain relative to the amount of tax revenue generated. 
It also explains why the welfare gains for smaller values of βs tend to produce smaller welfare 
gains than for higher values of βs, given that the annual gains in aggregate consumption tend 
to be greater in the short term following the shock. For example, the extremely high value of 
βs =10.0 produces a much greater welfare gain from the tax concessions because the 
relatively large gains in the short term are given much greater weight than the smaller gains in 
the long term.  
4.5  Higher Superannuation Contribution Rates 
For reasons discussed above, simulations were run where the superannuation contribution rate 
is gradually increased by 1 per cent every 5 year period after 2005 up to 2050 by which time 
14 per cent of labour income is being contributed to superannuation compared with the 

















contributions per se but the effect of the various tax exemptions, given higher contribution 
rates.  
 














The higher contribution rate magnifies the effect of tax exemptions on lifetime 
consumption of successive generations, national living standards, aggregate labour supply and 
national saving. It generally does not alter the patterns described for these variables, perhaps 
with one exception – the effect on lifetime consumption of successive generations, which is 
illustrated in Figure 5. The difference in the pattern compared with the base case (Figure 1) is 
that because the contribution rate steadily increases, so does the lifetime gain from exempting 
contributions from tax. By 2050 exempting contributions from tax would increase the lifetime 
consumption of the generation born in 2050 by 1.7 per cent compared with 0.25 per cent in 
the base case.  
The effect on national living standards is very slightly higher than in the base case 
which was illustrated in Figure 2 – but the effect of the various tax exemptions on living 
standards remains less than 1 per cent in any year. The boost to labour supply from exempting 
contributions from taxation rises to 1 per cent by 2050 compared with 0.2 per cent in the base 
case, and the effect in the case of the benefits tax exemption is slightly higher (which means a 
smaller negative effect than that shown in Figure 3 – it is zero by 2050.) The national saving 
effect is virtually unchanged as is the effect on social welfare.  
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5  Conclusion 
This paper has shown that changes in the taxation of superannuation changes the lifetime 
consumption plans of households. The effect occurs through the after-tax wage which is the 
relative price of leisure and therefore affects the work-leisure choice. The income effect of the 
change in the after-tax wage is muted, in the model applied here, by offsetting reductions in 
government spending in order to balance the government’s budget. The unanticipated nature 
of the effect causes a stronger response in the short term because households make corrections 
to plans that have become inconsistent with their target bequest. The biggest short term 
adjustment occurs in the case of an unanticipated tax exemption on superannuation benefits 
because middle aged working households derive a windfall which causes relatively large 
adjustments to their labour supply and consumption. 
The simulation results show that the intergenerational effects differ for a benefits tax 
exemption compared with a contributions tax exemption. The former confers a larger windfall 
on middle aged households than on young or post-retirement households. The contribution tax 
exemption benefits younger households more than older households. 
The positive outcome for social welfare of tax exemptions under all of the tax regimes 
modelled suggests that the reduction in taxation of superannuation is an unambiguous welfare 
improvement. However, as always simulation results reflect the assumptions of the model. 
Some of these assumptions have already been emphasised – the balanced budget assumption, 
the exogenous contribution rate, the exogenous bequest as a proportion of lifetime income. 
But also important is the representative agent assumption – that is, all households of a given 
generation are represented by a single household, so that there is no allowance for inequality 
within generations. This acts to qualify the results because changes in taxation and transfer 
payments do not in reality affect all households of a given generation equally. Accounting for 
within-generation equality would require a more complex microsimulation model.  
Subject to these qualifications, the results have demonstrated the potential effects of 
superannuation tax exemptions on intergenerational equity, national accounting aggregates, 
and social welfare. Whether these effects are large enough to warrant further policy responses 
is a matter of judgement. 
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Appendix A. Equivalence of TTT, TTE and ETT Regimes  
This Appendix shows that the TTT, TTE and ETT models are equivalent under certain 
assumptions. See Kingston and Piggott (1993) for a continuous time exposition that also 
includes equivalence of EET. Let xwi,j be the pre-tax superannuation contribution in period i 
in year j; rj be the return on the superannuation assets held in the fund in period j; ts,j, ty,j and 
tb,j be the tax rates on contributions, income on fund assets, and end benefits respectively in 
period j; Bn the value of superannuation assets when withdrawn at the end of n  number of 
periods of superannuation contributions. Assume that there are no tax-free thresholds, that 
contributions net of contributions tax are made at the start of each period and that the earnings 
tax is calculated on end of period values. The expression for Bn is  
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If it is assumed that the tax rates on contributions and benefits are constant over time, 
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where TCB,j is the sum of taxes paid on superannuation contributions and benefits over n 
periods. If a switch between the TTT, ETT and TTE regimes is both fully anticipated and 
neutral in its effect on TCB,j then Bn is unchanged, implying that the switch is Ricardian 
equivalent. In that case it would make no difference to forward looking governments and 
investors whether tax is levied on the way into the fund or on the way out. However the 
assumptions of neutrality with respect to TCB,j and full anticipation of changes in tax policy 
are unrealistic. Hence an unanticipated shift from one regime to another can be expected to 
affect the lifecycle plans of households.    25
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